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The possibility of algorithmic consciousness depends on the assumption that conscious states
can be copied or repeated by sufficiently duplicating their underlying physical states, leading to a
variety of paradoxes, including the problems of duplication, teleportation, simulation, self-location,
the Boltzmann brain, and Wigner’s Friend. In an effort to further elucidate the physical nature of
consciousness, I challenge these assumptions by analyzing the implications of special relativity on
evolutions of identical copies of a mental state, particularly the divergence of these evolutions due
to quantum fluctuations. By assuming the supervenience of a conscious state on some sufficient
underlying physical state, I show that the existence of two or more instances, whether spacelike
or timelike, of the same conscious state leads to a logical contradiction, ultimately refuting the
assumption that a conscious state can be physically reset to an earlier state or duplicated by any
physical means. Several explanatory hypotheses and implications are addressed, particularly the
relationships between consciousness, locality, physical irreversibility, and quantum no-cloning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Either it is physically possible to copy or repeat a con-
scious state or it is not. Both possibilities have profound
implications for physics, biology, computer science, and
philosophy.
Whether or not consciousness can be copied is fertile
ground for a multitude of troubling, if not fascinating,
thought experiments. There’s the duplication problem
[1]: imagine we can teleport a traveler to another planet
by creating “a precise duplicate of the traveler, together
with all his memories, his intentions, his hopes, and his
deepest feelings,” but then we decide not to destroy the
original copy? “Would his ‘awareness’ be in two places at
once?” There’s the simulation problem [2]: if conscious
awareness can be uploaded onto a computer, then how
do we know we aren’t simulated minds in simulated uni-
verses? In fact, because simulated universes are much
less expensive, in terms of matter and energy, than ac-
tual universes, then if consciousness can be duplicated,
we are almost certainly one of vast numbers of simulated
copies. There’s the problem of self-location [3]: if a psy-
chopath tells you that he has created an exact physical
copy of you and will torture it unless you pay a hefty
ransom, then you should pay the ransom unless you are
absolutely sure that you aren’t the copy. There’s the
problem of the Boltzmann brain: if consciousness is just
the result of atoms in a brain, what’s to prevent a set
of physically identical atoms, somewhere in the universe,
from accidentally coming together in just the right way
to create your brain? And what would that feel like?
Notice that each of these problems is a direct con-
sequence of the copiability or repeatability of conscious
states.1 If it turns out, for whatever reason, that con-
1 Throughout this paper, I’ll treat copiability and repeatability of
conscious states as essentially interchangeable because repeating
a conscious state (or resetting it to an earlier state) is akin to
copying it at a later point in spacetime.
scious states cannot be copied, then these and other prob-
lems disappear. Whether each of the above scenarios is
actually possible is an empirical question, and given the
rate that technology is advancing, it may be just a matter
of time before each is tested. There are related problems
that may never be testable such as, “Will a computer
ever become conscious – and how would we know?” Af-
ter all, there is no consensus on how to measure the ex-
istence or level of consciousness in an entity. Some say
that consciousness depends on the ability to pass a hypo-
thetical “Turing test.” Some say it depends on the level
of complexity in neural networks. Some say it depends
on certain activity in the brain. So how can we possi-
bly learn anything about the nature of consciousness if it
depends on a definition?
It is easy to get bogged down in the meaning of “con-
scious” and lose sight of the big picture. It’s as if the
question, “Will a ball near Earth experience a force of
gravity?” has been preempted by, “What do you mean
by ‘ball’?” So let me rephrase: “If I am near Earth, will
I experience a force of gravity?” My goal is to derive, if
possible, an objectively correct prediction to several ques-
tions such as: will it ever be possible to teleport a copy
of myself to another planet? Will it ever be possible to
upload my conscious awareness onto a computer so that
I can outlive my physical death? Will it ever be possi-
ble, perhaps in millions of years, for a collection of atoms
somewhere in the universe to accidentally come together
in just the right way to create my conscious awareness?
Will it be possible for me to experience these things? The
answer is yes only if my conscious states are fundamen-
tally such that they could be copied or repeated. Are
they?
First, let’s consider the question, “Will it ever be possi-
ble to upload me to a digital computer?” This a scientific
question if it can be phrased as a falsifiable hypothesis.
“It is impossible to upload me to a digital computer”
would be falsified, for example, by my being conscious
and aware while possessing a body consisting essentially
of on-off switches. But what do I mean by “me”? I
2mean my identity – but what is that? Questions like
this lead many to reject from the realm of scientific in-
quiry anything involving identity or consciousness. But
that’s a mistake because science is about making predic-
tions about our own experiences, and without a consis-
tent sense of identity, whose experiences are we predict-
ing?
In this paper, I will assume it is possible to copy con-
scious states and show how this assumption, in conjunc-
tion with special relativity, leads to a contradiction. In
doing so, I will rely heavily on the extent to which con-
sciousness and identity supervene on an underlying phys-
ical state. For this reason, I will begin with a discussion
of identity and why objections based on identity are in-
adequate to counter the conclusions of this paper.
II. QUESTIONING IDENTITY
Let’s consider what it means to upload me to a digi-
tal computer. I think it means two things. First, that
it’s me, that I experience it. (Let’s call this existence
of identity.) If a scientist tells me that an exact copy
of me has been uploaded to a computer, but I don’t ex-
perience whatever sensations accompany living inside a
computer, I will respond that I have not been uploaded.
“But I can’t tell the difference between you two,” the
scientist may respond. “Yes, but I can,” I would re-
ply, “and you have failed to upload me.” Second, that
my identity would persist; that as the computer phys-
ically evolves in time according to the laws of nature,
the consciousness it creates would continue to be mine.
(Let’s call this persistence of identity.) In other words,
if the computer begins in some initial physical state S1
that produces me in conscious state C1, and after awhile
physically evolves to physical state S2 that happens to
produce conscious state C2, that conscious state C2 will
still be mine, and I subjectively experience an evolution
from conscious state C1 to C2. And if, due to a random
quantum event, the computer were to evolve to physical
state S
′
2 (instead of S2) that happens to produce C
′
2 (in-
stead of C2), then conscious state C
′
2 will still be mine
and I subjectively experience an evolution from conscious
state C1 to C
′
2. I don’t expect the scientist to guarantee
that I will live forever – after all, the physical evolution of
the computer could simply stop producing consciousness
– but I do expect that as long as the physical evolution
of the computer continues to produce conscious states, I
will be the person experiencing them, not someone else.
In other words, if a scientist claims to have uploaded me
to a digital computer, if I don’t subjectively experience
(in the form of evolving conscious states) the physical
evolution of the computer over time, then that scientist
has failed. Let me combine existence and persistence of
identity into one concept: temporal continuity2 of iden-
tity (or transtemporal identity). Whether there really is
such a thing, and whether it matters, will be addressed
in the following sections.
In this paper the word consciousness3 includes identity
and a conscious state is a state experienced by someone;
that is, a person experiencing a conscious state has an
identity and one conscious state cannot be experienced
by more than one person. So if a particular physical
state produces a conscious state, and that physical state
includes (among other things) light sensors that are ab-
sorbing photons having a wavelength of 680nm, then the
produced conscious state may correspond to someone’s
subjective experience of seeing the color red, in which
case we can ask who is experiencing that conscious state
and whether that person is seeing red.
A. Boltzmann Brains and Bad Science
As it turns out, the Boltzmann brain problem is much
bigger than the weirdness of the occasional human brain
fluctuating into and out of existence. In cosmological
models in which Boltzmann brains dominate, not only is
any brain much more likely to be a random fluctuation,
but any complete person, world, or even galaxy is much
more likely to be a random fluctuation. Are you a Boltz-
mann brain? You might think the answer is no because
you can see a vast world around you and you seem to have
many years’ worth of memories that are consistent with
a long-lasting, law-abiding physical world. However, the
overwhelming majority of people who would make such
claims are, in these models, random fluctuations. They
are “Boltzmann observers” who have no right to believe
that any of their observations are reliable or that their
scientific predictions will come to fruition.
This is a problem. Science, after all, is about collect-
ing evidence and making predictions based on falsifiable
hypotheses. However, if a model based on science pre-
dicts that the foundation of science itself is not reliable –
then what? Sean Carroll eloquently sums it up [4]: “it’s
overwhelmingly likely that everything we think we know
about the laws of physics, and the cosmological model
that predicts we are likely to be random fluctuations,
has randomly fluctuated into our heads.” In other words,
if a model that is based on physical evidence in the world
around us predicts that that very evidence is an illusion,
then we should reject such a model as “cognitively un-
stable.”
2 This temporal flow is often called a “stream” of consciousness,
but many have argued that consciousness consists of a series of
discontinuous blips of awareness that are perceived as continuous.
This distinction is irrelevant to the present analysis.
3 Just as there is no consensus on the definition of consciousness,
there is no single term or phrase to represent it –others are men-
tality, sentience, self-awareness, and the subjective experience of
qualia.
3A similar fate befalls denial of identity because
the foundation of science fundamentally depends on
transtemporal identity. “A ball falls toward Earth at
9.8m/s2” is an hypothesis that, if incorrect, can be fal-
sified through experimentation. But that requires a sci-
entist to prepare the experiment, then perform it, then
collect and analyze data, and then determine whether the
hypothesis has been falsified. This series of events, all of
which are necessary in scientific investigation, occurs in
a temporal order, and if the scientist did not or could not
expect to be the same person throughout, then she would
have no reason to believe that she could test falsifiable
hypotheses. She would have no reason to trust science.
Therefore, any theory or model that rejects the tempo-
ral continuity of identity should be rejected as rendering
science internally inconsistent. Further, while transtem-
poral identity is necessary for scientific inquiry, it is not
itself subject to scientific scrutiny because no experiment
can falsify it; thus, there is no scientific rationale to doubt
the existence of transtemporal identity.
B. Fissioning Philosophers
Philosophers have had much to say about both the
existence and persistence of identity, but their analyses
almost exclusively depend on the assumption that con-
scious states can be copied. The typical philosophical
analysis of identity goes something like this: Identity is
produced by the brain; the brain is just a chuck of matter
that can be moved around, copied, replaced, and so forth,
at will; therefore, the notion of identity is problematic.
For instance, Parfit begins his analysis [5] with, “We
suppose that my brain is transplanted into someone else’s
(brainless) body, and that the resulting person has my
character and apparent memories of my life. [I shall here
assume] that the resulting person is me.” He then pro-
ceeds, in thought experiment, to slice up the brain, trade
brain sections with other people, sever connections be-
tween hemispheres, and so forth, to arrive at various con-
clusions (such as the “fission” or “fusion” of identities)
that are at odds with transtemporal identity. Zuboff [6]
also starts with replication of a brain that “is a precise
duplicate of yours in every discriminable respect...” and
concludes that so-called fission – in which “one subject
can, in a single next moment, experience two differing
non-integrated contents of experience” – is the neces-
sary outcome. These “brain-in-a-vat” style thought ex-
periments have dominated philosophical theories of mind
and identity, not to mention science fiction, for decades,
and represent the best prima facie arguments against
transtemporal identity.
However, an argument that relies on premise X can-
not be used to disprove an argument for ¬X. My goal in
this paper is to show, among other things, that conscious
states cannot be copied. Because the typical philosoph-
ical arguments depend on the in-principle copiability of
brains, mental states, etc., then not only are they inad-
equate to counter the arguments in this paper, they are
entirely inapplicable. In other words, the strongest ar-
guments against transtemporal identity depend on the
assumption that conscious states can be copied, but this
is the very notion that I am attempting to refute. There-
fore, any notion or theory of identity that depends on the
copiability of conscious states (or the copiability of brains
in conjunction with the supervenience of consciousness on
brains) is simply irrelevant to the present analysis.
C. Universal Beliefs
Why fight the notion of transtemporal identity in the
first place? After all, it’s what we all implicitly believe.
Every decision we make about the future depends on our
belief in identity. Let’s say that a travel agent was to
offer you the following options:
 For $10,000, you will spend a week at a resort in
Tahiti;
 For $6,000, an exact physical copy4 of you will be
created and will spend a week at a resort in Tahiti
while your current body is anesthetized;
 For $2,000, a really good copy of you – one that
looks, acts, and talks just like you but is not an
exact copy – will be created and will spend a week
at a resort in Tahiti while your current body is
anesthetized.
In all three cases, the underlying question you’ll no
doubt ask yourself is, “What will I experience?” If you
believe that an exact physical copy of you inevitably in-
cludes your identity, then you might be tempted to go
with the second option, given that the $4,000 in savings
could be enjoyed by you at a later date. And if you be-
lieve that a reasonably good copy of you includes your
identity, then you might be tempted by the third option.
In other words, your potential choice between the lat-
ter two options depends on (your beliefs about) whether
your identity can flow to a copy of you, not on whether
you have an identity. When choosing, you are, presum-
ably, not thinking about neural firings, corresponding to
pleasure sensations, in a brain that is similar or identi-
cal to yours; you are thinking about whether you will
experience those pleasure sensations.
This is also true, I suspect, of those philosophers who
officially refute transtemporal identity. This is easily
4 I have no idea what this phrase means, nor does any other physi-
cist, although many philosophers throw it around casually. An
exact copy in classical phase space is impossible because infinite
precision does not exist in the physical world; an exact copy in
quantum mechanical Hilbert space is impossible because of quan-
tum no-cloning; and so on. But for the sake of this section, let’s
pretend there is such a thing.
4demonstrated by proponents of the Many Worlds Inter-
pretation (“MWI”) of quantum mechanics, in which a
similar identity problem notably arises in the question of
what an observer experiences at some quantum mechan-
ical “branching” event (cf. [7]). Imagine an observer,
originally in state |Ψobs〉ready, who is about to perform a
measurement on a quantum mechanical system in initial
pure state |Ψs〉, which is a superposition of orthogonal
(or mutually exclusive) states |A〉 and |B〉 such that a
measurement of it will yield outcome A with 99% prob-
ability or outcome B with 1% probability:
|Ψs〉 =
(√
0.99 |A〉+
√
0.01 |B〉
)
(1)
The measurement apparatus, originally in state
|Ψm〉ready, is designed so that if outcome A obtains, the
observer will experience intense pain, while if B obtains,
he will experience neither pain nor pleasure. According
to MWI, which assumes the universality of quantum me-
chanics at any scale, the experiment causes the entire
system to linearly evolve according to:
|Ψobs〉ready |Ψm〉ready |Ψs〉
→ |Ψobs〉ready
(√
0.99 |Ψm〉A |A〉+
√
0.01 |Ψm〉B |B〉
)
→
(√
0.99 |Ψobs〉A |Ψm〉A |A〉
+
√
0.01 |Ψobs〉B |Ψm〉B |B〉
)
(2)
Notice that the final evolution in Eq. 2 remains a super-
position in which a state of the observer corresponding
to observation of outcome A (and thus the experience of
pain) is correlated to outcome A, and vice versa for out-
come B. In collapse interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics, the wave state in Eq. 2 instantaneously reduces to
either |Ψobs〉A |Ψm〉A |A〉, a world in which the observer
experiences intense pain with a likelihood of 99%, or
|Ψobs〉B |Ψm〉B |B〉, a world in which the observer avoids
pain with a probability of 1%. Transtemporal identity
is no problem in this case because the pre-measurement
observer can expect to become one or the other of the
post-measurement observers. However, because MWI is
a non-collapse interpretation in which every term in a
quantum wave state, no matter how macroscopic, corre-
sponds to an actual world, MWI implies that after the
measurement, there is a real observer correlated to out-
come A and a real observer correlated to outcome B.
Identity fissions, and neither post-measurement observer
has a better claim to “being” the pre-measurement ob-
server than the other [8]: “All your future selves, on all
your branches, are equally real and equally yours.” Like
many philosophers, the MWI proponent can, in an aca-
demic setting, disavow any belief in a transtemporal iden-
tity. Perhaps he will try to console himself by noting that
the experiment will cause his identity to fission so that,
after the measurement, there will exist an “equally real”
version of himself that has experienced no pain. But I
suspect that, despite fanciful arguments discounting no-
tions of enduring identity, he will be more than a little
nervous to carry out the above experiment. I suspect
that when push comes to shove, he will in fact be afraid
of the pain that he – not someone who looks and acts
just like him, but he – is likely to experience.
D. Much Ado About Nothing
The most likely objections to the arguments in this
paper will target transtemporal identity. But even if I
haven’t convinced you that science without identity is
unscientific, or that philosophy without identity is in-
applicable to this paper, or that belief in transtemporal
identity is essentially universal, it doesn’t matter because
the issue of identity is a red herring.
My goal in this paper is to determine whether or not
conscious states can be copied, where a particular con-
scious state is identified with a particular person. That
is, I want to answer questions like, “Is it possible in prin-
ciple to upload myself to a computer?” or “Is it possible
to teleport me to a distant galaxy?” To do so, I simply
assume that a person’s conscious state (i.e., a conscious
state corresponding to someone’s transtemporal identity)
supervenes on some underlying physical state that can
be copied, and then show that this assumption leads to
a contradiction. But if a person’s conscious state does
not supervene on physical state (whether because iden-
tity is an illusion, or identity fissions, or whatever), then
we come to the same conclusion that conscious states
cannot be copied, because there is nothing physical that
can be copied that will produce a conscious state of that
person.
Stated bluntly: if there is something physical that can
be copied that causes me to be uploaded to a computer,
then what are the logical consequences? (That is a ques-
tion I will explore in Section III.) But if there is not
something physical that can be copied that causes me
to be uploaded to a computer, then we have the answer:
(my) conscious states cannot be copied.
III. WHY CONSCIOUS STATES CANNOT BE
COPIED
A. Assumptions
In this section, I’ll lay out the structure of my argu-
mentation as well as some of the assumptions I make. I
will let conscious state (or mental state) include identity
so that two or more different people cannot experience
the same conscious state. However, different conscious
states could clearly be experienced by the same person,
such as if a person experiences conscious state C1 and
then later state C2, which is temporally downstream from
state C1. Also, I use “person” to refer to any conscious
entity, whether instantiated in human or other biological
or even nonbiological form.
5A scientist claims that he is able to upload me
to a digital computer. Do we have reason to doubt
his claim?
Let’s assume that the scientist’s claim is true and then
follow it to its logical consequences. First, he is claiming
to upload me. If he is right, then when he uploads me,
I will subjectively experience being conscious and aware
yet embodied not by a human body but by a collection
of physical objects (such as digital switches) configured
as a general purpose computer executing software code.
Next, because software is simply a set of instructions that
can inherently be copied and executed on any general
purpose computer, what happens if he uploads me to a
second computer? Will I subjectively experience both?
What would happen if those two experiences, respond-
ing to different stimuli (or inputs), start to diverge? It
might seem easy to solve the problem by adding an ad
hoc requirement that only the first software copy can be
executed, but how could Mother Nature possibly enforce
this rule if the two computers are spacelike separated –
i.e., causally nonlocal – so that the temporal ordering of
events is relative to an observer? Now, instead of soft-
ware, the scientist claims that he is able to create a copy
of me in a different spacetime position. He is not merely
claiming that he is able to make a reasonably good phys-
ical copy of my brain, or an exact copy of my brain, or
a reasonably good physical copy of my body, or an exact
copy of my body. Rather, he is claiming to be able to
copy me, identity and all. The same problems arise as
in the case of uploading me to a computer. I will argue
that the demands of special relativity are inconsistent
with the ability to freely copy a conscious state because
the following two assumptions lead to a contradiction:
 Supervenience of conscious states: A con-
scious or mental state C1 supervenes on physical
state S1, so that instantiation of physical state S1
is sufficient to create conscious state C1 of a person
having an identity. If physical state S1 physically
evolves over time to state S2 that is sufficient to
create conscious state C2, then state C2 will be the
same person (i.e., having the same identity) as state
C1.
 Copiability of conscious states: A copy of phys-
ical state S1, which is sufficient to create conscious
state C1, can be instantiated elsewhere in space-
time5 in a manner that does not prevent other in-
stantiations from evolving.
5 If state S1 depends on spatiotemporal location – i.e., if that
state cannot be instantiated elsewhere in spacetime – then the
assumption of Copiability is obviously false. To use the philoso-
pher’s lexicon, two physical systems are not “numerically iden-
tical” if they exist at different locations in spacetime, no matter
how physically similar they may be. So if one already accepts
that numerical identity is necessary for the same person to ex-
perience the same conscious state, then it follows that conscious
states cannot be copied or repeated.
Note that the second assumption (“Copiability”) de-
pends on the first assumption (“Supervenience”); Copi-
ability can be false on its own, but if Supervenience is
false, then Copiability must also be false because there is
nothing physical that can be copied to produce the same
conscious state of the same person.
The phrase “physical state” is meant in the broadest
sense possible. Classically, the physical state of a system
of matter might be fully described in phase space – i.e.,
in terms of the positions and momenta of each of its con-
stituent particles. However, we know that the classical
description of the universe is only an approximation and
fails to correctly describe and predict extremely small
systems, the purview of quantum mechanics. Quantum
mechanically, however, it can’t be said that any particu-
lar particle in a system even has a position or momentum
until measured; and while its position can be measured
to nearly arbitrary precision, quantum uncertainty guar-
antees a trade-off in the precision to which its momentum
can be simultaneously measured. Further, the quantum
mechanical description of a particle can’t be separated
from that of other particles with which it is entangled,
making the quantum mechanical prediction of a physical
system larger than a few atoms essentially impossible.
Quantum mechanics may itself turn out to be an emer-
gent approximation of a more fundamental ontology.
Therefore I do not intend to limit “physical state” to
any known description. Instead, by assuming that con-
scious state C1 supervenes on physical state S1, I simply
mean that there is something physical about the universe
that gives rise to that conscious state. Of course, there’s
no guarantee that a given physical state will create a
conscious state – probably very, very few will – but if
a conscious state exists then it depends entirely on the
underlying physical state. I also assume that a given con-
scious state might be created by more than one physical
state. In other words, it may be the case that conscious
state C1 arises from any member of some large set {S1,
S∗1 , S
∗∗
1 , ...} of underlying physical states, and that in-
stantiating any of these physical states will produce the
same conscious state C1 of the same person.
Further, while the following arguments apply to a
physical state of any size, they are more interesting and
elucidating when applied to a small or minimal physical
state S1 that produces conscious state C1 (although state
S1 need not be the absolute minimum or smallest state
that produces the person’s consciousness). For instance,
if it turns out that the human brain6 is sufficient to cre-
ate a person’s consciousness, then certainly that brain
6 Specifying physical state S1 as “the human brain” is quite sloppy,
as we really need to specify the features (e.g., relationships
among cells, molecules, electrons, etc.) that define state S1 and
give rise to conscious state C1. If, for example, state S1 depends
only on how cells act like digital switches, then S1 can be speci-
fied and instantiated in the form of a digital computer. If, how-
ever, S1 depends on quantum effects, then quantum no-cloning
may prevent specification of S1 at all.
6plus a body also creates the person’s consciousness. But
if, as engineers, our goal is simply to create the person’s
consciousness as simply and efficiently as possible, then
we may as well focus on just the brain. So when I as-
sert that conscious state C1 is created by physical state
S1, I don’t necessarily know what kinds of information or
sorts of physical attributes specify that physical state S1.
I also don’t know how big state S1 is. Is it the local state
of certain neural connections in one’s brain? The state
of one’s entire brain? One’s body? The planet? The uni-
verse? (Although, if it turns out as a matter of fact that
the smallest physical state S1 sufficient to create a con-
scious state C1 happens to involve particles throughout
the entire universe, then clearly that will prevent state
C1 from being copied.)
B. Spacelike Separated Copies
I will now show how the assumptions of Supervenience
and Copiability conflict with the demands of special rel-
ativity. With reference to Fig. 1, a physical state S1 on
which conscious state C1 supervenes exists at a Point 1
in spacetime. In other words, a conscious person having
an identity determined by state S1 exists at Point 1 –
let’s call her Alice and designate the person at Point 1 as
Alice1. For simplicity, assume that the information spec-
ifying state S1 is read and then the state is destroyed or
reconfigured soon afterward so that state C1 no longer
exists.7 The light cone of Point 1 is shown; events out-
side the light cone are called spacelike (or nonlocal) and
cannot have any cause-effect relationship, temporal rela-
tionship, or information connection to the event at Point
1; events inside the light cone are called timelike and do
have a temporal relationship to Point 1.
A copy of state S1 is instantiated at Point 2 (shown
with its light cone) and allowed to physically evolve to
a physical state S
′
2 that is sufficient to create conscious
state C
′
2. (For the moment we will ignore what may be
happening at Point 3.) The physical evolution of state
S1 over time is subject to physical laws and depends on
both random quantum events8 and chaotic amplifications
of initial conditions such that state S1 could evolve over
some time period to any one of a large set of mutually
exclusive states, among which S2, S
′
2, and S
′′
2 are possi-
bilities. By Supervenience, a conscious person exists at
Point 2, and that person is Alice – let’s call her Alice2.
7 This is not a requirement but does simplify the analysis. If it
turns out that the mere existence of the information necessary
to produce state S1 is itself adequate to produce state C1, then
it is impossible to destroy S1 without also preventing any future
instantiations of C1.
8 Whether or not quantum mechanics has anything to do with
consciousness, it is clear that conscious states can correlate to
(amplified) quantum events, such as the “click” a scientist con-
sciously notices when using a Geiger counter to measure decays
of radioisotopes.
Alice1 and Alice2 are the same person; Alice at Point 1 is
Alice at Point 2, and she will subjectively experience the
evolution from C1 to C
′
2 because of a temporal continuity
in her identity.9
FIG. 1. Spacelike separated instantiations of physical state
S1
Fig. 1 also shows a Point 3 (with its light cone), with
Points 2 and 3 lightlike to Point 1 but spacelike to each
other. A copy of state S1 is instantiated at Point 3 and
allowed to physically evolve to physical state S
′′
2 that is
sufficient to create conscious state C
′′
2 , where C
′′
2 is con-
sciously distinct from C
′
2 – that is, Alice would be able
to tell them apart. (For the moment we will ignore what
may be happening at Point 2.) By Supervenience, Alice
is created at Point 3 – let’s call her Alice3. Again, Alice3
is the same person as Alice1 and she will subjective expe-
rience the evolution from C1 to C
′′
2 because of a temporal
continuity in her identity.
Now, imagine for the moment in Fig. 1 that copies
of state S1 are instantiated at both of Points 2 and 3,
but that S
′
2 = S
′′
2 = S2 and C
′
2 = C
′′
2 = C2. Note that
Points 2 and 3 are timelike to Point 1, which is a nec-
essary condition if the information necessary to produce
the copies at Points 2 and 3 depends on information col-
lected at Point 1. Further, Points 2 and 3 are spacelike
to each other so that there is no fact about simultaneity
or temporal ordering between them, nor can information
pass from one to the other.10 We already know that if
9 To reiterate, this must be true if Supervenience is true, and if
Supervenience is not true, then conscious states cannot be copied
because there is no underlying copiable physical state that pre-
serves the person’s identity, and we can skip to the end of the
paper.
10 While Point 2 appears closer in time to Point 1, and thus earlier
than Point 3, in fact the interval in spacetime is the metric s =√
c2∆t2 −∆x2 −∆y2 −∆z2. Which of Points 2 and 3 occurs
earlier in time is actually relative to an observer.
7state S1 was not instantiated at Point 2, then Alice exists
at Point 3 and she will subjectively experience the evo-
lution from C1 to C2 because of a temporal continuity
in her identity. However, even when S1 is instantiated
at Point 2, Alice exists at both Points 2 and 3, she has
precisely the same subjective experience at both points,
and she will subjectively experience the evolution from
C1 to C2. This must be true because we already know
that Alice exists in conscious state C1 at Point 2. But
the creation of physical state S1 at Point 3 is spacelike
to creation of physical state S1 at Point 2, which means
that from the perspective of Point 3, there is no fact
about the creation of state S1 at Point 2. The creation
of S1 at Point 2 can have no physical effect at Point 3.
For the same reason that Alice exists and experiences an
evolution from C1 to C2 due to the creation of state S1
at Point 2, she exists and experiences an evolution from
C1 to C2 due to the creation of state S1 at Point 3. This
may seem philosophically odd, but (so far) there is no
physical contradiction.11 We should be careful, however,
not to imagine different Alices who happen to have very
similar experiences; Alice1, Alice2, and Alice3 are all the
same Alice. Supervenience requires that Alice1 experi-
ences the evolution of C1 to C2 due to physical evolutions
of instantiations of physical state S1 at both Points 2 and
3.
Finally, let’s return to the original configuration of Fig.
1, in which S
′
2 6= S
′′
2 and C
′
2 6= C
′′
2 – i.e., that they are
consciously distinct states.12 In that case, both Alice2
and Alice3 exist, but the underlying physical evolutions
of the two physical states S1 diverge. (It makes no differ-
ence which of the two systems diverges as the divergence
is relative to the other.) For the sake of clarity, assume
also that the entirety of the evolutions of states S1 (at
Point 2) to S
′
2 and S1 (at Point 3) to S
′′
2 are spacelike
to each other. Given that Alice exists at both Points 2
and 3, what does Alice actually experience in Fig. 1?
At both Points 2 and 3 she experiences state C1 arising
from state S1, but then does she subjectively experience
an evolution to C
′
2 or C
′′
2 ? There are exactly three logi-
cal possibilities13: she experiences neither, both, or one
or the other.
Is it possible that Alice experiences neither? Remem-
ber that Alice is created independently by instantiations
at both Points 2 and 3; the instantiation evolving from
11 Tappenden explains [9]: “How can two doppelgangers zillions
of lightyears apart whose simultaneity we know, from Special
Relativity, is entirely relative to an inertial frame, how can they
share a single mind?” The answer: no need for causal connection.
12 We can ensure that the states are distinct by designing the sys-
tems to correlate to amplifications of cosmic microwave back-
ground radiation originating from different directions and/or
points in spacetime.
13 These three options perfectly mirror the options suggested by
Saunders [10]: “Nothing, both, or else just one of them?” He
concludes that only the third alternative is possible, but does
not consider the effects of nonlocality.
Point 3 cannot be affected by the instantiation evolving
from Point 2. If Alice is created by the instantiation
at Point 3 and experiences an evolution from C1 to C
′′
2 ,
then nothing that happens in the evolution of state S1
at Point 2 to S
′
2 can affect Alice’s experience from C1 to
C
′′
2 . Therefore, she cannot experience neither.
Perhaps Alice experiences both? What would it feel
like for Alice to subjectively experience consciously dis-
tinct evolutions from C1 to C
′
2 and C1 to C
′′
2 ? Or, more
colloquially, what would it feel like for her to experience
diverging streams of consciousness? Before we indulge
in speculations about higher planes of consciousness or
fissioning identities, we should note the problem with lo-
cality. Note that the experience of Alice2 in Fig. 1 de-
pends on the underlying physical evolution of S1 to S
′
2,
while the experience of Alice3 depends on the underlying
physical evolution of S1 to S
′′
2 . Alice3 cannot experience
an evolution of conscious states that depends on a phys-
ical evolution of S1 to S
′
2, because S
′
2 is spacelike to S
′′
2 ,
just as Alice2 cannot experience an evolution of conscious
states that depends on a physical evolution of S1 to S
′′
2 .
Therefore, Alice cannot experience an evolution of con-
scious state from C1 to both C
′
2 and C
′′
2 .
Finally, is it possible that Alice experiences one or the
other? The problem here is that because the underly-
ing physical systems are spacelike separated, there is no
means or criteria by which nature can independently se-
lect one instantiation or the other for the continuity of Al-
ice’s identity. For instance, imagine that Mother Nature
simply required that the “first” instantiation of state S1
would assume Alice’s identity; that won’t work because
Points 2 and 3 are spacelike to each other so there is
no observer-independent fact about which happens first.
Perhaps Mother Nature could choose the point having
the shortest spacetime distance to Point 1, which in Fig.
1 would be Point 2. However, again, the spacelike sep-
aration of the points prevents the passage of any signal
from Point 2 to Point 3 to “stop” the creation of Alice’s
conscious state C1 at Point 3.
Therefore, having ruled out the only three possibilities,
the copiability of conscious states to spacelike locations
in spacetime leads to a contradiction. One might object
that the above argument depends on the instantiation
and evolution of spacelike-separated copies of state S1;
perhaps there is no problem when the copies are instan-
tiated locally to each other. This objection fails. If there
is something fundamentally impossible about the space-
like instantiation of copies, then it must be found in their
instantiation, not in their relative locations or the extent
to which they are separated. Further, the following sec-
tion will show that timelike instantiations of copies of
state S1 are equally problematic.
C. Timelike Separated Copies
The spacelike instantiations in Section B are problem-
atic because of a lack of causal connection. I will now
8show that a similar contradiction arises when we con-
sider two timelike instantiations of state S1 because they
would require impermissible backward-in-time causation.
Fig. 2 is comparable to Fig. 1, the primary difference
being that Point 3 is timelike to (and occurs after) Point
2, which is timelike to (and occurs after) Point 1. For
the same reasons, if we ignore what may be happening at
Point 3, then Alice2, who is the same person as Alice1 at
Point 1, exists at Point 2 and will subjectively experience
the evolution from C1 to C
′
2. And if we ignore what may
be happening at Point 2, then Alice3, who is the same
person as Alice1 at Point 1, exists at Point 3 and will
subjectively experience the evolution from C1 to C
′′
2 .
FIG. 2. Timelike separated instantiations of physical state S1
Now, imagine for the moment in Fig. 2 that copies
of physical state S1 are instantiated at both of Points 2
and 3, but that S
′
2 = S
′′
2 = S2 and C
′
2 = C
′′
2 = C2. By
the assumption of Supervenience, Alice exists and has
precisely the same subjective experience at both Points 2
and 3 and will subjectively experience an evolution from
C1 to C2. To the extent that any conscious state, when
it is experienced, is subjectively experienced as occurring
“now,” states C1 at Points 2 and 3 must be experienced
identically and thus must be subjectively experienced si-
multaneously. So, even though Point 3 objectively oc-
curs after Point 2, Alice’s conscious experience (which
includes the subjective experience of “now”) is the same
at both points. After all, if they were subjectively ex-
perienced as different times, such different experiences
would manifest themselves in different conscious states.
While this may seem philosophically odd, again there is
no contradiction.14
14 Zuboff explains [6]: “This experience [across brains] of being you,
here, now, would be numerically the same whenever, as well as
wherever, it was realized.”
Unlike in Section B in which the copies of state S1
are spacelike separated, Alice3 is in fact created after
Alice2, in which case a causal connection is possible in
principle. However, state S1 is already assumed (by Su-
pervenience) to be sufficient to create Alice in conscious
state C1, so the instantiation of state S1 at Point 3 must
necessarily create Alice in state C1, independently of her
creation at Point 2 (or any other event prior to Point 3).
In other words, the assumptions of Supervenience and
Copiability prevent the kind of causal connection that
would invalidate these arguments. For example, consider
the case in which creation of Alice2 causally prevents
the creation of Alice3; if that were true, then creation of
conscious state C1 at Point 3 would depend on facts that
transcend physical state S1, thus contradicting Superve-
nience. Therefore, if state S1 is sufficient to create Alice
in state C1, then instantiation of S1 at Point 3, and its
corresponding creation of Alice3, cannot be altered by
the existence of Alice2. For the same reason that Alice
exists and experiences an evolution from C1 to C2 due
to the creation of state S1 at Point 2, she also exists and
experiences an evolution from C1 to C2 due to the cre-
ation of state S1 at Point 3. Again, we should be careful
not to imagine different Alices who happen to have very
similar experiences; it is the same Alice.
Finally, let’s return to the original configuration of Fig.
2, in which S
′
2 6= S
′′
2 and C
′
2 6= C
′′
2 (i.e., they are con-
sciously distinct states). In that case, both Alice2 and
Alice3 exist, but the underlying physical evolutions of
the two states S1 diverge. Given that Alice exists at
both Points 2 and 3, what does Alice actually experience
in Fig. 2? At both Points 2 and 3 she experiences state
C1 arising from state S1, but then does she subjectively
experience an evolution to C
′
2 or C
′′
2 ? Like in the case of
spacelike separated copies of state S1, there are exactly
three logical possibilities: she experiences neither, both,
or one or the other.
Regarding neither, I have explained why instantiation
of state S1 at Point 3, and its evolution to state S
′′
2 ,
will produce Alice subjectively experiencing state C1 to
C
′′
2 independently of instantiation of state S1 at Point 2.
Therefore, it cannot be neither.
Regarding both, the problem here is that Alice experi-
ences the evolutions of C1 to C
′
2 and C1 to C
′′
2 as simul-
taneous (from her subjective perspective), because they
both begin at the same conscious state C1. Therefore, for
Alice to experience both conscious evolutions, it must be
the case that the conscious experience of Alice2 depends
not only on the underlying physical evolution of S1 (at
Point 2) to S
′
2, but also on the underlying physical evolu-
tion of S1 (at Point 3) to S
′′
2 . However, if Alice is to expe-
rience conscious states in real time with their underlying
physical states, this scenario would require impermissi-
ble backward-in-time causation, because what she expe-
riences prior to Point 3 would depend at least in part on
events occurring after Point 3. Further, because of phys-
ical indeterminism (e.g., chaos and quantum mechanical
randomness), it cannot be known at Point 2 whether, or
9when, additional copies of state S1 will be instantiated.
Therefore, it would be impossible for Alice to experience
both an evolution of C1 to C
′
2 and C1 to C
′′
2 if she ex-
periences them in real time with the underlying physical
evolutions.
The only possible way for Alice to experience both evo-
lutions would require two facts: first, that Alice’s con-
scious states are experienced after (i.e., not in real time
with) the physical states that produced them; and sec-
ond, that Alice could not experience any conscious states
until the instantiation of additional copies of state S1 is
no longer possible. In other words, Alice would only be
able to experience conscious state C1 created by multiple
copies of state S1 after the final copy of state S1 was in-
stantiated. Thus, Alice can only subjectively experience
consciousness after which time her conscious states can
no longer be copied or repeated – in which case Copia-
bility is false.
Finally, regarding whether Alice will experience one
evolution or the other, I have explained why instantia-
tion of state S1 at Point 3, and its evolution to state
S
′′
2 , will produce Alice3 subjectively experiencing state
C1 to C
′′
2 . Therefore, if Alice is to experience conscious
states in real time with their underlying physical states,
whether or not Alice2 will experience the evolution from
C1 to C
′
2 depends on the future fact of whether Alice3
is created by instantiation of state S1 at Point 3, an-
other impermissible backward-in-time causation. Thus,
for Alice to experience one evolution or the other, not
only would Alice’s conscious states necessarily be experi-
enced long after the physical states that produced them
have long since disappeared, but Alice could not experi-
ence any conscious states until the instantiation of addi-
tional copies of state S1 is no longer possible. Thus, Alice
can only subjectively experience consciousness on or af-
ter which her conscious states can no longer be copied or
repeated – in which case Copiability is false.
Therefore, having ruled out the only three possibilities,
the copiability of conscious states to timelike locations in
spacetime leads to a contradiction. In conjunction with
the conclusion of Section B, it follows that Copiability is
false.
IV. DISCUSSION
The assumptions of Supervenience and Copyability
lead to a contradiction, whether copies of a conscious
state are created spacelike or timelike. Therefore, Copy-
ability, which depends on Supervenience, is false. Conse-
quently, a conscious state cannot be copied or repeated
(unless something about the universe prevents the copies
from evolving differently); said differently, if two in-
stances of the same conscious state could evolve to dif-
ferent conscious states, they cannot both exist. This
conclusion does not speak to the veracity of the state-
ment, “Consciousness is created by the brain,” but if that
statement is true, then there must be something physical
about the brain that prevents it from being copied. Why
should this be the case? And what are some potential
implications?
A. Explanatory Hypotheses
Why might it be fundamentally physically impossible
to copy or repeat conscious states? It may be the case
that there is no way to adequately measure physical state
S1, or if there is, that there is no way to recreate it else-
where in spacetime. Some potential reasons include: the
information necessary to specify the physical state is con-
tained in distant particles that cannot be reached; at-
tempting to measure the information inherently destroys
it, for example, because of reduction of a quantum wave
function; the information cannot be measured with ad-
equate precision due, for example, to quantum uncer-
tainty; the state includes quantum entanglements with
distant particles that cannot be recreated; and/or the
state is too large to measure or instantiate elsewhere.
The assumption of Supervenience does not depend on
physical state S1 being a quantum state, nor do the ar-
guments in this paper depend on any relationship be-
tween consciousness and quantum mechanics. Having
said that, many of the above explanatory hypotheses for
the physical inability to duplicate conscious states invoke
quantum mechanics. This should not be entirely surpris-
ing; the only known physical mechanism that prevents
the instantiation of multiple copies of the same entity is
quantum no-cloning, a no-go theorem that asserts the im-
possibility of creating an identical copy of an unknown
quantum state. It may well be the case that whatever
physical state S1 is required to create conscious state C1
depends on quantum information that prevents it from
being copied. Aaronson [11], for example, points out that
if a conscious chunk of matter is “unclonable for funda-
mental physical reasons,” then that unclonability could
be a consequence of quantum no-cloning if the granular-
ity a brain would need to be simulated at in order to
duplicate someone’s subjective identity was down to the
quantum level.
Further, the non-repeatability of a conscious state im-
plies irreversibility, and the concept of irreversibility per-
vades physics: classically in the form of the Second Law
of Thermodynamics and increasing entropy15, and quan-
tum mechanically in the form of decoherence [12], which
occurs “as soon as a single [correlated] quantum is lost
to the environment.” Since there will always be those
who claim that any quantum mechanical process is re-
versible in principle by acting on the system with the
reverse Hamiltonian, we could limit ourselves to “any
fact of which the news is already propagating outward
15 Strictly speaking, classical physics is time-reversible; increasing
entropy is entirely a statistical result and is not an immutable
law of nature.
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at the speed of light, so that the information can never,
even in principle, be gathered together again in order to
‘uncause’ the fact” [11]. If we indeed live in a universe
with nonnegative curvature, as is currently believed, and
given that almost the entire night sky is black, we can
regard virtually every photon emitted into space as ir-
retrievable. Thus if it turns out that consciousness can
only result from irreversible processes, that irreversibility
may itself be manifested in a physical state that cannot
be read or copied because some of the information speci-
fying it is embedded in photons streaming through space
at the speed of light.
B. Implications
First, of course, the conclusion that conscious states
cannot be copied or repeated instantly renders moot the
philosophical problems mentioned in the Introduction.
Two others will be broached here.
Consciousness is not algorithmic. The possibili-
ties of mind uploading and computer consciousness de-
pend on whether consciousness is fundamentally algorith-
mic – that is, whether consciousness can be reduced to
a finite set of input-dependent instructions. Because an
algorithm can be executed in the form of software on any
general-purpose computer independently of its underly-
ing physical substrate, any algorithm can be copied with
no fundamental limitation on the number of copies that
can be executed; it can also be repeated on the same com-
puter by resetting that computer and then executing the
software again. If a conscious state cannot be copied or
repeated, but an algorithm can, then an algorithm cannot
produce a conscious state. That inevitably leads to the
conclusions that Strong Artificial Intelligence (“Strong
AI”) is likely false (cf. [13]) and that mind uploading
and computer consciousness are likely impossible.
Wigner’s Friend is not conscious. In Eq. 1, we
were told that the quantum mechanical system |Ψs〉 is
initially in a superposition of states |A〉 and |B〉; when the
observer performs a thousand experiments on systems
identically prepared in state |Ψs〉, he finds that around
99% of them are measured in state |A〉 and the remaining
in state |B〉. However, what if the observer had been
fooled? What if instead of a thousand systems in a pure
state, he was actually provided with 990 systems already
in state |A〉 and 10 already in state |A〉 – i.e., a mixed
state? Is there a way for him to modify the experiment
to figure this out? Yes: by making measurements in a
new basis in which one element, |C〉, is parallel to |Ψs〉
and the other element, |D〉, is perpendicular. If each
system was originally in a pure state, then all 1000 will,
with certainty, be measured in state |C〉; if the systems
were mixed, then some are likely to be measured in state
|D〉.16 While the principle is relatively easy to explain,
16 This is because the systems starting in state |A〉 are in a superpo-
the actual process of measuring in the new basis – called
an interference experiment – is prohibitively complex in
all but the simplest situations.
In Eq. 2, let’s rename the observer either Schrodinger’s
Cat (“SC”) or Wigner’s Friend (“WF”); both refer to es-
sentially identical thought experiments in which an iso-
lated macroscopic system involving some quantum me-
chanical event is allowed to evolve until finally observed
by a Super-observer (Schrodinger or Wigner, respec-
tively). When Wigner finally confers with his friend post-
measurement, WF of course reports having measured ei-
ther outcome A or B. But did WF collapse the wave
function when he performed the measurement? Or did
WF remain in the superposition shown in Eq. 2 until
Wigner conferred with his friend, in which case Wigner’s
observation of WF collapsed the wave function? This is
the same question as whether WF was in a pure or mixed
state at the time of Wigner’s observation, and the only
way for Wigner to know is by repeatedly doing an in-
terference experiment on WF in a basis parallel to the
state in Eq. 2. But the only way to do that would be
to repeatedly measure WF in a coherent superposition
of states, which requires that WF’s state (specifying his
body, brain, memories, etc.) is itself reversible. Such ma-
nipulations, if they were possible, would require erasing
WF’s memory and further require WF to experience “the
same mental processes over and over, forwards in time as
well as backwards in time” [11]. Deutsch [15] describes a
hypothetical method for experimenting on WF by hav-
ing him send a message to Wigner that is uncorrelated to
the measurement outcome17, but concedes that such an
experiment requires memory erasure. While many schol-
ars have asserted the “in-principle” possibility of such an
experiment18, Deutsch attempts to overcome otherwise
insurmountable technical hurdles of performing a WF-
type experiment on humans by instead positing conscious
computers.
However, if a conscious state cannot be repeated, as I
showed in Section III, then this kind of manipulation on
a conscious observer is not possible. In other words, if
the WF (or SC) experiment can actually be performed,
then WF (or SC) is not conscious; if he is conscious,
then the experiment cannot be performed. Further, if
consciousness is not algorithmic, then Deutsch’s attempt
sition of |C〉 and |D〉 with nonzero amplitudes, so when each such
system is measured in the {|C〉,|D〉} basis, some will be measured
as |C〉 and some as |D〉; and vice versa for those systems starting
in state |B〉. However, because there is some nonzero probability
that all 990 initially |A〉 states and all 10 initially |B〉 states are,
by random quantum “accident,” measured in state |C〉, which is
identical to the outcome predicted for systems in a pure state,
it actually requires infinitely many interference experiments to
confirm a pure state (cf. [14]).
17 But see [16], which points out why a post-measurement message
from WF will always be correlated to the outcome.
18 But see [17], which argues that the thermal isolation required for
such reversibility precludes performing the experiment on any
living thing we might regard as conscious.
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to salvage his experiment by substituting a computer for
a person fails. Because the ability to measure WF in a
coherent superposition requires reversibility, and because
a conscious state is not reversible (because it cannot be
repeated), it follows that WF’s conscious measurement is
related to an irreversibility in the measurement process.
A conscious state can only arise after reversal of the state
is no longer possible – that is, when the state is truly
irreversible. Therefore, consciousness may be a direct
result, and indication, of the irreversibility of a physical
process.19
C. Concluding Remarks
Conscious states are produced by the brain;
the brain is a just a chuck of matter; it is copi-
able in principle; therefore, copying a con-
scious state is merely a technological problem.
The allure of this faulty logic is irresistible and has
led physicists and philosophers into a minefield of in-
tractable problems and seeming paradoxes. More careful
scrutiny of the assumptions, particularly in light of phys-
ical limitations imposed by special relativity on copies of
conscious states instantiated at different points in space-
time, yields a contradiction: there is something about
consciousness that prevents it from being copied or re-
peated at will.
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